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Interventions as War Propaganda:  
The Case of the Yugoslav Wars 
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Abstract: Although the UN Charter (mostly) prohibits the use of force or the 
threat of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of 
a state, recent theoretical developments in the field of international relations, 
such as the emergence of the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P), draw 
attention to the atrocities committed against populations by their own states 
and represent a gateway to the justification of international interventions on 
humanitarian grounds. The legitimacy of such cases is hotly disputed, these 
operations oftentimes being compared to wars of aggression. This article 
aims to highlight how the propaganda in favour of the 1999 NATO bombing 
of Yugoslavia exhibits certain features similar to those of war propaganda 
and whether sharing the same toolkit constitutes sufficient grounds for 
qualifying as war propaganda. 
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Introduction 
 
The Charter of the United Nations forbids the use of force or the threat 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state,1 
                                               
* Beatrice Crețu is a PhD student at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest, with the 
thesis “Peaceekping Missions under the UN, NATO and the EU in Africa and Europe (1995 
– 2015)”. Her research interests include peace and conflict studies, human rights and 
international cooperation. Contact: beatricenicolle.cretu@drd.unibuc.ro.  
1 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 24 October 1945, Chapter 
I, art. 2, paragraph 4.  
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excluding exceptional circumstances, such as upholding the right to 
individual or collective self-defence.2 At the same time, war propaganda has 
been condemned in international law by a series of UN General Assembly 
resolutions (110 / 1947,3 381 / 1950,4 819 / 19555), which denounce any form 
of propaganda meant to provoke or incite any threat to peace or any act of 
aggression. Resolution 381 / 1950 defines “propaganda against peace” in the 
following manner: “(1) incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression; (2) 
measures tending to isolate the peoples from any contact with the outside 
world, by preventing the press, radio and other media of communication from 
reporting international events, and thus hindering mutual comprehension and 
understanding between peoples; (3) measures tending to silence or distort the 
activities of the United Nations in favour of peace or to prevent their peoples 
from knowing the views of other State Members”.6 
Even so, evolutions in recent years have indicated a certain 
acceptance of interventions justified on humanitarian grounds. For instance, 
the concept of responsibility to protect highlights the duty states bear to 
shield their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity, as well as their responsibility to prevent incitement 
in favour of these acts;7 the refusal or inability to fulfil these responsibilities 
                                               
2 Ibidem, Chapter VII, art. 51. 
3 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 110 (II) Measures to be taken against 
propaganda and the inciters of a new war, A/RES/2/110, 3 November 1947. 
4 Idem, Resolution 381 (V) Condemnation of propaganda against peace, A/RES/381, 17 
November 1950. 
5 Idem, Resolution 819 (IX) Strengthening of peace through the removal of barriers to free 
exchange of information and ideas, A/RES/819(IX), 11 December 1954. 
6 Idem, Resolution 381 (V) Condemnation of propaganda against peace, A/RES/381, 17 
November 1950, paragraph 2.  
7 Idem, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, art. 138. 
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assigns them to the purview of the international community, which takes it 
upon itself to act collectively, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter (Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression), including via the use of force.8 
These interventions can take several forms; there are clauses included 
in the UN Charter for measures involving the use of force (demonstrations, 
blockades, other operations by air, sea and land, which can include 
invasions),9 but they can also be organized as peacekeeping missions. 
However, such interventions entail the violation of the principles of 
sovereignty,10 territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of other 
states.11 These principles are enshrined in the UN Charter, generating a well-
debated contradiction in terms.  
War propaganda exhibits certain specific features, such as the 
dehumanization of opponents, galvanizing and radicalizing the population, 
disinformation, reducing the number of victims on the enemy side and 
maximizing or inventing victims on one’s own side, weaponizing historical 
myth etc. Propaganda in favour of intervention is aimed, first of all, at 
legitimizing war on humanitarian grounds and painting the conflict zone as a 
threat against international peace and security (by causing an influx of 
refugees, destabilizing economic relations, arms trafficking, the domino 
effect etc). What these two forms of propaganda share is that both attempt to 
                                               
8 Idem, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, art. 139. 
9 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 24 October 1945, Chapter 
VII, art. 42. 
10 Idem, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 24 October 1945, Chapter I, art. 2, 
paragraph 1. 
11 Idem, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 24 October 1945, Chapter I, art. 2, 
paragraph 7.  
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justify instigating or getting involved into a conflict, as well as objectionable 
acts committed along the way, such as bombardments, destruction, mass 
killings, genocide or rape used as a weapon of war.  
This article aims to draw attention to the characteristics pro-
intervention propaganda during the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO 
has in common with the propaganda employed during the Yugoslav wars. 
The study was chosen as it offers ample opportunity for examining these two 
phenomena. The former president of Serbia and of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, was even accused at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of using the media to spread 
false and exaggerated information about attacks made by Bosnian Muslims 
and Catholic Croats against the Serbian people. At the same time, NATO’s 
1999 bombing of Yugoslavia remains a controversial episode, since it was an 
operation deployed without UN authorization and caused abundant 
destruction and numerous civilian victims.  
To this end, we plan to identify several similarities between the 
propaganda used to justify NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia in 1999 and 
Serbian war propaganda. For our analysis, we shall employ the following 
definition of propaganda: the process of manipulating the target audience by 
disseminating information, constructing a line of argumentation or carrying 
out certain actions in accordance with a well-defined ideological foundation, 
in the service of previously established objectives.  
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Short history of the conflict in Kosovo 
 
The Kosovo region is endowed with a special symbolic status and is 
mythologized as the historical homeland of the Serbian people: the Serbian 
prince Lazar was defeated near Pristina by the Ottoman Empire on 28th June 
1389, marking the beginning of a long period of Ottoman domination (428 
years). However, over the years, Kosovo’s population changed drastically in 
terms of ethnic composition: in 1991, the 1,956,196 inhabitants were 
comprised of 82% Albanians, 11% Serbs and Montenegrins, 3% Muslim 
Serbs (the so-called “gorani”), 2% Roma and 2% other minorities. The 
majority of Kosovo Albanians are Muslim, speak Albanian and use the Latin 
alphabet.12 
During the communist regime, Kosovo gained de-factor republican 
status (it had secured a significant degree of autonomy granted by the 
Yugoslav constitution of 1974); in March 1989, however, Slobodan 
Milošević officially incorporated the region within Serbia. The campaign for 
regaining autonomy started as early as June 1991 with the election of Dr. 
Ibrahim Rugova as president of the unofficial Kosovo “republic”, yet his 
pacifist policies proved to be ineffectual, even after the Dayton Agreement 
was signed in November 1995, which is why the KLA (Kosovo Liberation 
Army) started resorting to guerrilla tactics in 1996.13 
The actual war took place between 5th March 1998 and 11th June 1999 
and was characterized by the KLA’s guerrilla attacks, followed by Serbian 
                                               
12 N. Thomas, K. Mikulan, The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992 - 
2000, Botley, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2006, pp. 31 - 32.  
13 Ibidem, p. 32. 
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retaliation, comprised mostly of ethnic cleansing. If the KLA strategy was to 
provoke brutal reprisals on the Serbian side and to escalade the conflict to 
such a degree that the international community would feel obligated to 
intervene, creating the necessary conditions which could allow Kosovo to 
gain independence, Operation Potkovica was aimed at disguising ethnic 
cleansing as military tactics directed towards guerrilla forces, achieved by 
systematically killing Kosovo Albanians or displacing them in Albania or 
other regions, after which the Serbian authorities could repopulate the area 
with Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. However, the KLA was also 
guilty of ethnic cleansing attempts, as removing Serbs and other minorities 
from Kosovo figured among their objectives.14  
The Racak episode from January 1999, which left 45 Kosovo-
Albanian civilians dead, galvanized the international community and 
compelled NATO to act by bringing the belligerents to the negotiating table. 
In the end, the Rambouillet negotiations amounted to failure, though; the 
document was signed only by the Kosovo delegation, while the Serbian 
offensive continued to be predicated on ethnic cleansing. Operation Allied 
Force was initiated on 24th March 1999 and consisted mainly of aerial 
bombing. The number of aircraft employed as part of the operation increased 
from 344 (in March) to 1,031 (in June), while military raids increased from 
30 – 50 / day in the first week to 300 / day at the end of May.15  
                                               
14 Ibidem, pp. 47 - 50.  
15 Mark Webber, “The Kosovo War: A Recapitulation”, in: International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 85, No. 3, The War over Kosovo: Ten Years On, May 
2009, pp. 449 - 450.  
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The impact on Serbian forces was limited; destructions were mostly 
concentrated on civilian infrastructure: Serbia’s electricity production was 
compromised, as well as its oil refineries, its arms industry and its 
communication capabilities. In addition, 59 bridges, 9 major road 
connections and 7 airports in Serbia were destroyed; 500 civilians were killed 
and other 800 were hurt, as reported by Human Rights Watch. Serbian 
military casualties ranged between 576 (according to Serbian authorities) and 
5000 (figure provided by NATO).16 
During the bombardment, at least 4,400 Kosovo-Albanian civilians 
were killed as a result of the surging number of attacks by Serbian forces on 
the Kosovo population. Furthermore, 863,000 civilians fled Kosovo during 
March – June 1999 and other 590,000 were displaced, amounting to 90% of 
the population leaving their homes, the greatest influx of refugees in Europe 
since the Second World War.17 At the end of the war, Resolution 1244 of the 
UN Security Council from 10th June 1999 placed the province of Kosovo 
under the administration of UNMIK (UN Interim Administration in Kosovo) 
and authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping mission under NATO, 
namely KFOR (Kosovo Administration Force).18 
 
Pro-intervention propaganda 
 
 NATO propaganda constantly positioned itself in antithesis with 
Yugoslav propaganda, by painting Serbian mass-media as deceitful and 
                                               
16 Ibidem, p. 451. 
17 Ibidem, p. 451. 
18 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
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exaggerated. “Propaganda” is a term which carries negative connotations, 
which is why NATO leaders tried to distance themselves from this label, 
although their efforts can easily be described as such, and, instead, tried to 
characterize the discourse of the Yugoslav state as “propaganda”. On 10th 
May 1999, Tony Blair even declared: “We take freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press for granted… The Serb media is state-controlled. It is 
part and parcel of Milošević’s military machine.”19  
 One of the features of pro-intervention propaganda was, as in the case 
of Serbian war propaganda, the distortion of facts, which can be observed 
when it comes to the discourse around the Rambouillet negotiations. While 
they were publicly presented as genuine attempts towards conflict resolution 
which suffered as a result of Serbian inflexibility, several officials later 
declared that the clauses of the agreement were intentionally worded so as to 
prove inacceptable for the Yugoslav delegation.  At the same time the British 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook was encouraging Albanian representatives to 
sign, in order to initiate the bombings, a few hours before the deadline, 
Serbian representatives were handed a draft agreement with an additional 56 
pages, in which they were asked to accept unrestricted access for NATO 
troops on the entire territory of Yugoslavia, forcing them to refuse.20 A State 
Department official even declared: “We intentionally set the bar too high for 
the Serbs to comply. The need some bombing and that’s what they are going 
to get.” The declarations were noted by journalists, but they were never 
reported, which would contradict Tony Blair’s assertion on the freedom of 
                                               
19 Philip Hammond, “Reporting ‘Humanitarian; Warfare: propaganda, moralism and 
NATO’s Kosovo war”, in: Journalism Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2000, p. 367. 
20 Ibidem, p. 377. 
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Western press.21 The Australian historian Christopher Clark described the 
Rambouillet Agreement as even more drastic than the ultimatum Serbia 
received in 1914 from Austria-Hungary.22 
 Garnering public sympathy for NATO’s cause was also achieved by 
overemphasizing certain incidents and endowing them with symbolic 
value. A relevant example recalls the events of Racak of 15th January 1999, 
which NATO leaders presented as the massacre of 40 Albanian civilians, an 
angle later embraced by the Western media outlets as well. Racak became a 
pretext for handing Yugoslavia the ultimatum of either signing a peace 
agreement with the KLA, mediated by Western powers, or of being subjected 
to bombings,23 even though the French newspapers Le Figaro and Le Monde 
had reported that the victims were a result of a skirmish between Serb forces 
and the KLA.24 
 Moreover, pro-intervention propaganda efforts took the classic form 
of demonizing the enemy, aimed both at slandering emblematic individuals 
(e.g. Milošević) and at dehumanizing the entire Serbian people. Thus, with 
NATO’s blessing, the Western media engaged in a campaign of denigration 
towards Slobodan Milošević, characterizing him as a “warlord”, “Serb 
butcher”, the “Butcher of Belgrade”, the “Butcher of the Balkans”, “the most 
evil dictator to emerge in Europe since Adolf Hitler”, a “psychopathic 
tyrant”, “evil”, “a man of no mercy”, a “former Communist hardliner” and 
                                               
21 Seth Ackerman, “What Reporters Knew About Kosovo Talks - But Didn’t Tell”, in: 
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting Media, 2 June 1999.  
22 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, London, Allen 
Lane, 2012, p. 456. 
23 Philip Hammond, op. cit., p. 376. 
24 ***, “Update on Racak”, in: Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, 18th July 2001, available 
at http://fair.org/press-release/update-on-racak/, accessed on 19th September 2017.  
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comparing him to Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein and Pol Pot.25 The Serbian 
people were subjected to the same process and described as “barbarians” with 
questionably mental sanity and lack of humanity.26 The act of dehumanizing 
the enemy is meant to portray the Other as a primitive and irrational 
opponent, capable of inhuman acts, essentially an agent of Evil: confronting 
such an enemy thus becomes a moral duty. In his book “The New Ideology 
of Imperialism”, Füredi noted that post-1980s interventions are no longer 
justified to the public by military reasoning, but by appealing to the collective 
sense of morality, bringing the humanitarian dimension to the fore, even 
though these interventions remain a form of masked imperialism.27 
 Pro-intervention propaganda is also exhibited by the means of 
exaggerating or minimizing vital statistics and numbers. One of the tactics 
employed  was spreading news of huge numbers of Muslim women raped by 
Serbs, although they could not be vetted following the investigations carried 
out by UN representatives: The UN Population Fund, which drafted a report 
on the subject of sexual violence in Kosovo, based on interviews with 
Albanian refugees, does not mention the exact number of interviewed women 
and made implausible accusations, not supported by any proof (such as 
stabbing pregnant women in the stomach and skewering the foetuses). Ron 
Redmond, the then-spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, was also accused by journalists of making statements describing 
acts of extraordinary cruelty, for which he offered no proof.28 
                                               
25 Philip Hammond, op. cit., p. 377. 
26 Ibidem, p. 378. 
27 Frank Füredi, The New Ideology of Imperialism. Renewing the Moral Imperative, London, 
Pluto Press, 1994, p. 110. 
28 Philip Hammond, op. cit., p. 379. 
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 The mystification of ethnic conflict is another similarity between the 
two types of propaganda. In this case, it manifests itself by romanticizing and 
placing the discourse on the causes of conflict in a simplistic paradigm of 
ethnic tensions, externalized by outbreaks of hatred predicated on 
unsophisticated and primitive tribal lines, proof of their backwards nature in 
need of a Western re-education process29 - a mark of imperialist thought.   
 All instruments of manipulation described above would not have had 
the same level of efficiency in the absence of the complicity of the press – 
what BBC correspondent Martin Bell labelled “journalism of attachment”, in 
order to single out a new style of news reporting, more involved and biased, 
shedding its former tone of neutrality “in the battle between good and evil, 
right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor”. Many journalists adopted this 
subjective style to report on the events in Kosovo and to minimize the 
negative consequences of the NATO intervention. An eloquent example is 
the different ways of reporting the same news story of 30th May 1999 by 
Reuters and The Guardian. The incident referred to the destruction of a 
crowded bridge in Vavarin, leaving 9 dead and 17 wounded; however, the 
titles are drastically in contrast: “NATO bombing Wrecks Carnage on 
Serbian Town Bridge” (Reuters) vs “Planes buzzed overhead and then death 
came” (The Guardian).30 We can note the changing of the predicate from the 
active to the passive voice in the title in The Guardian, in order to obscure 
the subject and dilute the responsibility for the damages and victims. This 
                                               
29 Ibidem, p. 379 - 380. 
30 Julijana Mojsilovic, Stephen Bates, “Planes buzzed overhead – and then death came”, in: 
The Guardian, 31st May 1999, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/31/balkans, accessed on 19th September 
2017.  
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subjective attitude could be considered a counter-reaction to the prolonged 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and to the war in Bosnia, where the 
involvement of the international community was unsatisfactory and the 
measures taken were found wanting.31  
 
Efficiency 
 
The 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO forces remains a 
controversial episode. Marjorie Cohn argues in her article “NATO bombing 
of Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention or Crime Against Humanity?” that the 
bombings constituted the perfect opportunity for the United States to 
consolidate their military hegemony in the Balkans and control the oil flux 
from the Caspian Sea,32 by redirecting it through the territory of Turkey, not 
through Russia or the former Soviet republics (the bombing of the Novi Sad 
bridges, for instance, alongside other strategic points on the Danube, halted 
international transport and, implicitly, the transit of Caspian oil from the 
Black Sea on the route favoured by Russia. For Cohn, the humanitarian 
justification of the intervention was merely a pretext dismantled by the fact 
that the bombardment left between 500 – 1800 dead and numerous other 
victims and destruction in its wake, comprising the public infrastructure of 
Yugoslavia, not just military objectives: bridges, highways, railroads, 
                                               
31 Philip Hammond, op. cit., p. 375. 
32 Marjorie Cohn, “NATO bombing of Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention or Crime Against 
Humanity?”, in: International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Vol. 15, 2002, p. 87.   
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factories, construction equipment, media centres, hospitals, schools, 
apartment buildings, houses, buses, forests etc.33  
Moreover, apart from terrorizing the entire population, they lead to 
increasing violence in Kosovo and generated a significant flux of refugees.34 
There is data which suggests that the bombings caused more victims than 
were recorded in the three months prior to the intervention, period which was 
supposed to be designated as a “humanitarian catastrophe”.35 
In the author’s view, the United States’ objective of ensuring 
hegemony on the international stage, especially relative to Russia, was 
secured by maintaining military bases in the Balkans, controlling resources 
and the labour market in Eastern Europe, which can materialize in the form 
of investment opportunities and export markets for Western companies.36 
The arguments are supported by statements made by officials such as the 
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Wesley Clark (“[the operation] 
was not designed as a means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing. It was not 
designed as a means of waging war against the Serb and MUP [internal 
police] forces in Kosovo. Not in any way. There was never any intent to do 
that. That was not the idea”)37 or the US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson 
(“This is about America’s energy security. It’s also about preventing strategic 
                                               
33 Ibidem, p. 80. 
34 Ibidem, pp. 82 - 83.  
35 Ibidem, p. 106. 
36 Marjorie Cohn, op. cit., p. 93. 
37 Noam Chomsky, “A Review of NATO’s War over Kosovo”, in: Z Magazine, April-May, 
2001, available at https://chomsky.info/200005__/, accessed on 19th September 2017. 
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inroads by those who don’t share our values. We’re trying to move these 
newly independent countries towards the west”).38  
 Another aspect which did not elude the international community was 
the questionable legality of the intervention, which took place without the 
consent of the United Nations Security Council, the only international body 
with the authority to sanction measures requiring the use of force, as per 
article 42 of the UN Charter.39 Furthermore, article 2, paragraph 4 imposes 
upon its Member States the resolution of conflict by peaceful means and 
forbids the use of force or the threat of force,40 while paragraph 7 upholds the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state, lacking 
authorization from the Security Council.41 It can be also argued that the 
intervention in Yugoslavia violates principle VI of the Nürnberg Tribunal, 
which expressly forbids the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements 
or assurances”42 and describes as war crimes (among others) as “wanton 
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity”43 and crimes against humanity as “inhuman acts done 
against any civilian population”.44  
                                               
38 George Monbiot, “A discreet deal in the pipeline”, in: The Guardian, 15th February 2001, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2001/feb/15/oil.georgemonbiot, 
accessed on 19th September 2017. 
39 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 24 October 1945, chapter 
VII, art. 42. 
40 Ibidem, chapter I, art. 2, paragraph 4. 
41 Ibidem, paragraph 7.  
42 United Nations, International Law Commission, Text of the Nürnberg Principles Adopted 
by the International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 
II, 1950, principle VI, paragraph a(i), p. 376.  
43 Ibidem, principle VI, paragraph b, p. 377. 
44 Ibidem, paragraph c, p. 377. 
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Consequently, through the military operations carried out in 
Yugoslavia, NATO triggered a war of aggression, attacking the civilian 
population and destroying the infrastructure of the state by using cluster 
bombs in populated areas, bombing during daytime, attacking mobile targets 
without first ensuring that they were military objectives and bombing areas 
with no military purpose, such as the radio and television station in 
Belgrade.45 These actions also violate the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War), which 
specifies that military operations during war cannot be directed towards the 
civilian population and civilian objectives.46 
 Even though President Slobodan Milošević and other Serbian 
officials have been accused of war crimes at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, no equivalent charges have been pressed 
against NATO leaders responsible for carrying out the bombing on the 
territory of Yugoslavia,47 proof that pro-intervention propaganda must have 
been at least partly efficient. In recent years, the emergence of the concept of 
responsibility to protect, outlined at the 2005 United Nations World Summit 
by Secretary General Kofi Annan in two reports entitled “A More Secured 
World: Our Shared Responsibility”48 and “In Larger Freedom: Towards 
                                               
45 Marjorie Cohn, op. cit., p. 99. 
46 International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Geneva, 12 August 1949. 
47 Marjorie Cohn, op. cit., p. 99. 
48 United Nations, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations Department 
of Public Information, 2004. 
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Development, Security and Human Rights for All”,49 has allowed for a more 
permissive view on what previously constituted territorial inviolability and 
non-intervention in domestic affairs. As such, it falls within under the 
responsibility of each individual state to protect its population from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, otherwise the 
international community will take it upon itself to act towards the fulfilment 
of these objectives, whenever necessary. This ideological development could 
constitute an argument in favour of the intervention in Yugoslavia, seeing as 
the Yugoslav state failed to protect its own citizens from ethnic cleansing. It 
is certainly a line of reasoning employed even today, for example in pieces 
arguing that the behaviour of the Syrian state towards its citizens (such as the 
use of chemical weapons)50 is valid grounds for an international 
intervention.51 
 
Conclusions 
 
 In his article, “Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War”, 
Ryan Goodman identifies a so-called model of pretext-wars (according to 
                                               
49 United Nations General Assembly, In larger freedom: towards development, security and 
human rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005. 
50 Stephanie Nebehay, “Syrian government forces used chemical weapons more than two 
dozen times: U.N.”, Reuters, 6th September 2017, available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-putin/putin-in-syria-says-
mission-accomplished-orders-partial-russian-pull-out-idUSKBN1E50X1, accessed on 19th 
September 2017. 
51 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “How the World Could – and Maybe Should – Intervene in Syria”, 
The Atlantic, 23rd January 2012, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/how-the-world-could-and-
maybe-should-intervene-in-syria/251776/, accessed on 19th September 2017. 
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which revisionist states would start or involve themselves more easily in 
conflicts, seeing as a permissible legal regime would reduce the costs of said 
conflict)52 and dismantles it empirically by referencing case studies 
conducted using the database Correlates of War. This database identifies 
three types of issues which can lead to violent conflict: (1) territorial claims; 
(2) foreign policy behaviour; (3) regime / government changes. Humanitarian 
interventions would fall under the third type of issue, with the least possibility 
of degenerating in armed conflict. In comparison, territorial points of 
contention prove to be the most volatile.53 
 His argument is centred around the hypothesis that encouraging 
revisionist states to justify the use of force as a humanitarian exercise can, in 
fact, facilitate conditions favourable to peace54 and he discusses the concept 
of “blowback”, describing a situation in which the public construction of pro-
war justification limits the actions of decision-makers in later stages (i.e. 
portraying the enemy as a threat to international security in the early stages 
of triggering a war could later prevent decision-makers from adopting a more 
conciliatory approach).55 Similarly, propaganda in favour of humanitarian 
interventions can transform the discourse on war and facilitate the process of 
conflict resolution by expanding the variety of negotiation options and 
possible compromises, even if they are only done in order to save face;56 for 
                                               
52 Ryan Goodman, “Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War”, in: The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 1, January 2006, p. 114. 
53 Ibidem, pp. 119 - 120.  
54 Ibidem, p. 116. 
55 Ibidem, pp. 123 - 124. 
56 Ibidem, pp. 129.  
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instance, renouncing territorial claims in exchange for concessions on the 
rights of ethnic minorities. 
 In the case of Kosovo, the author argues that humanitarian 
justification for the use of force allowed NATO leaders to make difficult 
political concessions and de-escalate the conflict without resorting to ground 
forces, by introducing this new variable as a point of debate.57 According to 
this line of reasoning, propaganda in favour of humanitarian interventions 
would encourage the resolution of conflicts rather than serve as a pretext for 
starting a war. In addition, there are voices highlighting that, as a result of the 
bombings, the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians came to an end, as did 
Slobodan Milošević’s government. On the other hand, critics of the 
intervention point out the scope of destruction, the number of civilian 
casualties and the unnecessary suffering caused by the bombings,58 alongside 
the operation’s faulty legitimacy. 
 To conclude, I would argue recalibrating the perspective on the issue 
under discussion. Without a doubt, propaganda in favour of humanitarian 
interventions can share certain features with war propaganda, but it would 
only qualify as such if the operation in question were to be classified as a war 
of aggression. If we were to label the bombing of Yugoslavia in such a 
manner, keeping in mind that the strategic bombing of civilians is considered 
a war crime59, then pro-intervention propaganda also becomes war 
                                               
57 Ibidem, pp. 130. 
58 Human Rights Watch, The Crisis in Kosovo, 2000, available at 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm, accessed on 19th September 
2017.  
59 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), Geneva, 8th of June 1977, art. 35, art. 51, paragraphs 4-5, art. 52, paragraphs 2. 
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propaganda. Supporters of the intervention will, however, never accept this 
taxonomy, due to their fundamental ideological divergence with respect to 
what constitutes “aggression”.  
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